Author: KR Phanda
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: April 26, 2005
Dr BR Ambedkar, whose birth anniversary
was celebrated on April 14, is remembered for his commendable work for
the uplift of Dalits. What, however, is not known, is that he had made
an analysis of the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan at the 1940 Lahore
Congress. No other writer during the time, had such a clear observation
vis-à-vis the demand's ramifications. Even Jinnah was impressed
by Ambedkar's analysis that appeared in Pakistan or the Partition of India
(Thackers, Bombay, 1940).
After the failure of the Quit India
Movement (1942), Gandhi sought to rebuild bridges with Jinnah. He had many
a tête-à-tête with Jinnah on the issue of Pakistan between
September 9 and 27, 1944 at the latter's residence. In a letter to Jinnah,
on September 15, 1944, Gandhi asked, "I find no parallel in history for
a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation apart
from the parent stock" (Gandhi-Jinnah Correspondence, Amalendu Dé).
Jinnah in his reply dated September 17 wrote, "For the moment, I would
refer two publications to you, although there are many more-Dr Ambedkar's
book and MRT's Nationalism in Conflict in India. We maintain and hold that
Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a
nation" (Ibid). Expectedly, the talks failed and Jinnah told Gandhi, "I
sometimes wonder what could be common between practical politics and yourself,
between democracy and dictator of a political organisation of which he
is not even a four anna member" (Ibid, p 79).
Ambedkar analysed the case for Pakistan
from different angles: Defence, Muslim sentiments, financial resources,
communal peace and exchange of population. To him, there were two governing
factors which determined the case for Pakistan: "First, the defence of
India, and second, the sentiment of Muslims." The Simon Commission had
revealed in 1930 that Indians considered temperamentally inclined to join
the armed forces post-independence, mostly came from areas that were to
be included in Pakistan. Therefore, Hindustan could not be defended without
Pakistan. Dr Ambedkar observed if India were to remain politically a singular
unit, and the two-nation mentality fostered by the Muslim League continued,
Hindus would find themselves between the devil and the deep sea with respect
to the defence of India. He pointedly asked, "Hindus have a difficult choice
to make: To have a safe Army or a safe border! Is it in their interest
to insist that Muslims should remain part of India to have a safe border,
or should they welcome its separation from India to have a safe Army?"
Further, the financial statistics
revealed that as against Rs 52 crore contributed by Hindus, only seven
crore rupees came from Muslim majority areas. Ambedkar lamented: "How many
Hindus are aware of this tragedy? How many know at whose cost this tragedy
is being enacted? If they mean to stop it, the surest way of putting an
end to it, is to allow a Pakistan to come into being. To oppose it is to
buy a sure weapon for their own destruction" (Ibid, pp 99-101).
Ambedkar suggested exchange of population
too. In his words, "The best way to solve the (Hindu-Muslim) problem is
the exchange of alien minorities within its border, with those of its own
who were outside its border, with a view to bringing about homogeneous
states." This is what had happened in Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. (Ibid,
pp 115-116). Had Gandhi and Nehru acted in the national interest, Hindu-Muslim
issues would have been a thing of the past.
