Author: Vijay Sazawal
Publication: Kashmir Herald
Date: August 8, 2006
URL: http://www.kashmirherald.com/main.php?t=OP&st=D&no=182
[Speech delivered at the National Advisory
Council on South Asian Affairs (NACSAA) event at the Cosmos Club in Washington,
DC. The meeting consisted of South Asian born policy experts, Washington Think
Tanks, and U.S. State Department officials.]
Many observers in Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter
called Kashmir) believe today that the solution to the nearly 60-year old
problem may lie in self-governance. Before we explore that concept further,
let us address the other subject: the fear of trans-nationalism, which actually
led to the Kashmir problem in the first place.
This aspect of the Kashmir problem is not
well known. That is because most of the relevant records were not available
until very recently. In fact many of "political and secret department
records" from 1947 that were prepared by the Commonwealth Relations Office
(CRO) - now called the Foreign and Commonwealth Office - were declassified
about ten years ago. The India Office Records, which used to be administered
by the CRO, are now administered as Public Records in the British Library
Asia, Pacific & Africa Collections based in London.
Surprisingly, not many South Asian scholars
have shown much eagerness to learn from these 50-year old papers recently
made available. They allow clearest view of how the Whitehall, British Military,
CRO, Governor-General and Chairman of India's National Defense Committee,
British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi, as well as Indian and
Pakistani cabinet ministers, pondered publicly and privately on issues surrounding
Kashmir before and after Kashmir was invaded in 1947. Most policy analysts
have their own "pet approaches" and I have experienced that first
hand in Washington when I see scholars arguing for the "same old, same
old" (i.e., "India needs to do more") solutions, when the handwriting
on the wall is clear that any future solution to the Kashmir problem will
be people-centric, rather than land-centric, and apply equally to both parts
of Kashmir. Meanwhile, two authors that have readily drawn from newly available
historical documents in London are Alistair Lamb and Chandrashekhar Dasgupta.
And what do some of the new historical papers
show? Perhaps, it is the first time one explicitly see the British bureaucracy
setting the markers for the British policy in the subcontinent with Philip
Noel-Baker, as the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, leading
the charge both in defining the approach related to Kashmir's future and in
protecting British strategic interests in the subcontinent. But it was left
to the British High Commissioner in Pakistan, Lawrence Grafftey-Smith, who
had this to say about the Governor-General of India accepting the accession
of Kashmir in a memorandum to Noel-Baker (reproduced from File L/P&S/1845
dated 29 October 1947):
Indian government's acceptance of accession
of Kashmir is the heaviest blow yet sustained by Pakistan in her struggle
for existence. Strategically, the frontier of Pakistan which must be considered
as requiring defense is very greatly extended since India would gain direct
access to the North-West Frontier and tribal areas where infinite mischief
can be made with "Pathanistan" or other slogans. Afghanistan policy
will almost certainly change for the worse; and disturbances and disorders
in Gilgit and the North West Frontier zone generally may excite Russian interests
and appetites.1
Indeed the British administration, while being
generally supportive of the accession, did believe that Indian control of
the western borderlands of the princely state (and especially the western
region of Jammu) would pose a grave threat to Pakistan which could lead to
Balkanization of West Pakistan, and would upset their own strategic interests
since at that time the Whitehall and the Pakistani government were also actively
discussing a military alliance that would maintain British military presence
in the north-west frontier region.
Once the Indian counter-attack began on October
27, 1947 (five days after the Pakistani army and its surrogates had launched
the invasion into Kashmir), the British diplomatic and military directives
were mostly focused on securing Srinagar and retaking portions of the Kashmir
valley occupied by invaders, whereas the Indian army suddenly found it "difficult"
to retake portions of Jammu region seized by the invading force from Pakistan.
The British held all the cards: Mountbatten, not Nehru, was the head of India's
cabinet defense committee (a mistake by Nehru that is considered to be among
his biggest blunders), and the military chiefs in India and Pakistan were
British nationals reporting to a British supreme commander. Political directives
from the Whitehall to British civil and military officers in the subcontinent
were precise in stating that India should be denied full reoccupation of Maharaja's
princely state and a cease-fire should take place along a well delineated
boundary that disconnected Indian Kashmir from Pakistan.
The newly declassified papers also clearly
show how the British Prime Minister Atlee tricked Nehru in believing that
Indian initiative to approach the United Nations (UN) on the Kashmir aggression
would be followed up by vigorous effort on part of the British-led Indian
Army to retake Poonch and Mirpur areas from Pakistani invaders, when in fact
the British had no such plans. Indian inexperience in international diplomacy
and British cunning are two of the main messages that come through in the
50-year old secret documents.
My point in all of this is that if one does
not know this historical perspective, how is the one to fully comprehend why
the "Bus Service" linking Indian and Pakistani portions of Kashmir
has not paid the kind of immediate dividends that many observers had hoped
for? In the one year since the service was initiated on April 7, 2005, only
600 people have availed of this service. Is it because it is extremely excruciating
to get approval for boarding the bus (as many would have you believe) or is
it simply because there are just not that many "divided families"
to begin with, notwithstanding the propaganda that vested interests have unleashed?
The reality is that the line of control (LOC)
is more or less a pretty clean division between various ethnic entities that
make up the old princely state and that the current boundary can sustain regional
stability even when its political future is questioned. As borne out by the
history that includes four wars, the LOC provides military and geo-political
stability in the subcontinent. Furthermore, travel across the LOC does represent
a major confidence building measure (CBM) as I will explain a bit later.
Having linked the genesis of the Kashmir problem
to the fear of Pashtun trans-nationalism the British believed would be unleashed
if the "Frontier Gandhi" (Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, who the British
saw as being pro-India) was to have a sympathetic sponsor on the eastern borders
of Pakistan's north-west frontier province (meaning Indian Kashmir), it is
the time to shift to possible solutions. One topic that is very hot these
days is self-governance.
The recent introduction of the concept of
"self-governance" has a bit of ironic history. It was preceded by
the concept of "mutual demilitarization" and both concepts most
recently were proposed by General Pervez Musharraf, the President and the
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of Pakistan. General Musharraf has already created
new lexicology of political terms by redefining democracy, the rule of law
and the freedom of press in Pakistan. So it was only natural that he would
redefine other equally pertinent terms to suit to his brand of governance.
On October 8, 2005, parts of Pakistani-Administered
Kashmir, especially around Muzaffarabad, were subjected to a violent earthquake,
and the loss of life and property was not only immense, but also well beyond
Pakistani's ability to manage. There were reports that many Kashmiri terrorist
camps in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) were destroyed along with Jihadi warriors
occupying those training camps.
As if to dispel the hopes of optimists, terrorists
struck with vengeance in New Delhi on October 29, 2005, at multiple shopping
malls, killing 62 people and wounding over 200. Indian security officials
connected the outrage to operatives belonging to the Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT),
an organization declared by the U.S. to be a foreign terrorist organization
(FTO). The LeT is based in Lahore, Pakistan, and since being listed as FTO
has conducted its operations under the name of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). It would
be only natural for General Musharraf to create a convenient diversion to
turn the focus away from the LeT which is known to have close links with the
Pakistan's Military Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
That is exactly what happened two days later
on October 31, 2005. Popularly called the "Iftar Diplomacy," since
the General has a history of making dramatic announcements in his first meeting
with the Press after Ramadan, the General proposed that both India and Pakistan
should demilitarize on their respective sides of Kashmir. Taken to task by
India for indulging in public grandstanding rather than serious bilateral
diplomacy, the General quietly retreated to prepare for another weighty announcement
at the next opportune moment.
He did not have to wait long. In a meeting
with visiting All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leaders from Srinagar on
January 5, 2006, General Musharraf brought up the issue of self-governance.
The press quoted him saying that, "For any solution to Kashmir to be
durable, it has to be in accordance with wishes of Kashmiri people. I hope
that India would respond positively to Pakistan's proposal to demilitarize
the disputed Himalayan region and grant it self-governance."
The Kashmiri visitors, who have accumulated
considerable wealth for themselves and their clans while clamoring for independence
on the Indian side of Kashmir, were quick to pick up the new mantra. Mirwaiz
Umer Farooq, the leader of the visiting separatist delegation chimed in by
saying that, "Proposal for self-governance in Kashmir should be addressed,"
though he could not say then or later what exactly was meant by "self-governance,"
considering that Indian Kashmir is governed by locally elected officials who
are predominantly Kashmiri Muslim politicians and administrators and the State
enjoys (relatively speaking) a great degree of political autonomy within India.
I subsequently participated in a Voice of
America (VOA) Urdu program that brought together South Asian political analysts
from the US, Kashmir, India and Pakistan. No one could even guess what General
Musharraf meant by self-governance during that discussion. I suggested that
since the General does not feel any need for improvement on his side of Kashmir,
it may be that General Musharraf's models of self-governance were the political
instruments of governance in either the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) or the
Northern Areas (NA). Let us examine those models and try to see if we can
come up with General Musharraf's definition of self-governance.
The two areas of Pakistan Administered Kashmir
- AJK and NA - follow differing models of governance. Areas of Gilgit and
Baltistan were separated from the rest of the Pakistani held territory and
were directly ruled by a Political Agent, a system that was in place during
the colonial rule. The AJK, on the other hand, had a Presidential form of
government, but until 1970 the President of AJK was appointed and dismissed
by Pakistani officials. The first legislative assembly of AJK was established
in 1971. It passed the "Interim Constitution of Azad Kashmir Act, 1974,"
that introduced a parliamentary system of governance by creating the AJK Legislative
Assembly ("Lower House") and the AJK Council ("Upper House").
The Legislative Assembly currently has 49 seats and the Council is comprised
of 14 members. Superficially, it looks like a good working architecture.
That is until you look into the details. The
AJK Council is chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and its Vice-Chairman
is the President of AJK. The Prime Minister of Pakistan appoints five members
of the Council among federal ministers and members of the National Assembly
(all Pakistanis), The Prime Minister of AJK is an ex-officio member and the
rest are selected from the AJK Assembly.
In the 49 seat Assembly, 41 are elected directly
with 12 of those seats (30%) assigned to "refugees settled outside of
AJK", and the remaining 8 elected indirectly (5 reserved for women, 1
each for religious scholar, technocrat and an overseas expatriate). The 12
Mohajir seats based mostly in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar usually
tilt the political balance in the AJK politics, and there are times when some
"desirable candidates" (desirable to the Pakistani military-supported
establishment) who may face harsh prospects in AJK safely get elected from
one of the Mohajir seats.
Laws passed by the AJK Council do not have
to be approved by the AJK Assembly, and they do not need the assent of the
President of AJK. However, laws passed by the AJK Assembly have to be approved
by the Council and require Presidential assent. In reality the AJK Council
is "managed" by the Federal Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and is so
closely associated with the Pakistani government that most AJK citizens believe
the Council probably meets in Islamabad since it is practically invisible
in Muzaffarabad. The majority of the AJK citizens are mostly ignorant about
workings of the AJK Council that controls almost all official business and
laws that affect daily lives of its people.
AJK just conducted an election for the Assembly
on July 11, 2006. The prospect of winning various Mohajir seats attracted
the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), and
the People's Muslim League (PML) to participate in the AJK elections, in addition
to regular players, namely, the Muslim Conference (MC) and the Pakistan People's
party (PPP). Candidates from political parties that question Pakistani claims
on Kashmir were disqualified. Amid allegations of rigging, MC won 19 seats,
PPP won 7 seats, PML won 4 seats, MQM won 2 seats, and the rest of the contested
seats are scattered among independents and minor parties. In most parliamentary
institutions the legislative body is intended to be pluralistic so as not
to imply the tyranny of the majority. Yet, the Islamabad establishment is
taking no chances and the Prime Minister, the President, the Speaker and the
Deputy Speaker all belong to the same party (MC) which enjoys full confidence
of General Musharraf.
If the polity of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)
is a shining example of self-governance, the self-governance in the Northern
Areas (NA) is worthy of a gold medal.
The NA are officially known as Gilgit and
Baltistan. Following the cease-fire between India and Pakistan, the Pakistani
government "negotiated" an instrument of governance within the Pakistan-Administered
Kashmir in April 1949. The is known as the "Karachi Pact" and should
not be confused with the "Karachi Agreement" signed on July 18,
1949 between India and Pakistan under auspices of the United Nations Commission
for India and Pakistan.
The Karachi Pact was signed by Nawab Mushtaq
Gurmani, representing the Government of Pakistan, Sardar Ibrahim Khan, representing
the Azad Kashmir government, and Choudhry Ghulam Abbas, representing the MC.
Two interesting observations are of interest. First, no representative from
the NA participated in this Pact and yet the deal was made to put all affairs
of the NA under the control of the "Political Agent" assigned by
the Government of Pakistan. Second, the Karachi Pact may not be an official
document after all. Sardar Ibrahim Khan stated in a public gathering in London
(in front of Dr. Shabir Choudhry and others) that he did not sign any such
agreement. Indeed, my colleague Khalid Hasan of the Daily Times (Lahore),
who once used to be part of the Pakistani political establishment, has more
than once mentioned that the "so-called Karachi Agreement is of doubtful
legality" and "no copy of this Agreement exists in the government
records." And yet it is true that the matters of life and death in the
NA were once decided by a mere Joint Secretary in Pakistan's Ministry of Kashmir
Affairs.
In practice very Pakistani government since
1949 has treated the NA as a colony of Pakistan, although some Pakistani officials
after 1970 have claimed that these areas are a part of Pakistan. I say this
because for many years people in the NA were denied not only the right of
franchise, but also the right of legal recourse to courts either in Pakistan
or AJK. In effect, the people of the NA were denied their basic human rights
by politicians and military rulers in Pakistan while the same leaders were
clamoring for wars of liberation to annex Indian Kashmir.
Even though it was as early as in 1972 that
the AJK Assembly passed a resolution demanding the return of the NA from Pakistani
direct control to AJK (this and many similar appeals were simply ignored by
successive Pakistani governments), it was not until 1993 that the full bench
of the AJK High Court passed a verdict that the administrative system of the
NA is arbitrary, and its governance should be handed over to the AJK government.
The Pakistan government challenged this order
in the "AJK Supreme Court," which came forth with a compromise decision
in 1994, holding that "the verdict we reach is that the NA are part of
the J&K State but not part of AJK as defined by the Interim Constitution
Act of 1974." The Pakistani government received an assuring nod that
it can continue its policy of isolating the NA from AJK and maintain its direct
authority over Gilgit and Baltistan.
However, the 1994 verdict did bring changes
in the federal administration of the NA. The Pakistani government issued a
"Northern Areas Council Legal Framework Order (Schedule-II)" in
October 1994, which created a Northern Areas Executive Council (NAEC), a 26-member
body for which elections were held in October 1994, with two major caveats.
The first catch was that only national political
parties of Pakistan, but not of AJK, could participate in these elections.
The second catch was that no bill passed by the NAEC could become law unless
signed by the "Chief Executive," the trusted Federal Minister for
Kashmir Affairs. So the NAEC had no legislative authority and served more
as an advisory council.
In March 1995, it was announced that members
of the NAEC would receive same status and privileges as members of the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While I share the visions of FATA areas
being a haven for Taliban and sundry Mujahideen fighters, the reality is that
the NA is populated by some of the most beautiful, docile and friendly people
in the entire universe, not just in Kashmir, who have weathered considerable
injustice with mostly quiet dignity for a very long time.
The landmark decision in 1999 by the Supreme
Court of Pakistan, directing Pakistan's government to undertake new steps
to improve legislative, administrative and legal rights of the people of NA
has led to some improvements (primarily establishing an appellate court in
Gilgit which is headed by a government official rather than a judge) but still
leaves a lot to be desired. The advisory body NAEC was slightly enlarged and
renamed as the Northern Area Legislative Council (NALC) and given minor legislative
powers on local matters including local taxes. The changes appear to be cosmetic
because in the elections held since, the electoral process has remained unchanged
- AJK parties are disallowed participation and the Chief Executive of the
Council continues to be Pakistan's Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs. It
is no surprise that the NALC has not imposed any local taxes (some doubt if
the body has any legislative authority) as the administration has provided
no locally managed mechanism for tax collection.
In October 2002, Pakistani government loosened
its direct grip on the NA a bit by giving NALC authority related to postings
and transfers of lower-tier government employees, which in reality is executed
by the Chief Secretary assigned from Pakistan to the NA. In order to motivate
Pakistani bureaucrats to take postings in the NA, the chief secretary of the
NA now receives same wages and status as chief secretaries of other provinces
of Pakistan.
As if that was not enough to remind ordinary
citizens of NA that they are a colony of Pakistan, the NA continues to be
governed under the Frontier Crime Regulations (FCRs) - a relic of British
colonialism - that is imposed in the FATA. The law requires people to seek
and receive prior permission from the Police before traveling from their home
towns to any other areas, even inside the NA. It comes as no surprise that
many political activists in the NA are demanding either integration with AJK,
or complete independence from Pakistan or, or as is the case with the Balawaristan
National Front (BNF) for a "Balawaristan" which includes Gilgit,
Baltistan and adjoining areas. The British, it seems, were right about the
fears of trans-nationalism on the western frontiers of the princely state.
The dismal record of Pakistan in denying any
political and legislative autonomy to its side of Jammu and Kashmir is a national
shame. But for its leaders to preach on the joys of self-governance to others
is outright deception and simply reflects on the kind of duplicity that is
a trade-mark of most military dictatorships. I am not happy saying this but
that is a fact. My father used to say, "If you speak one truth, you will
have avoided a hundred lies." The people of the AJK and the NA have to
face those lies every day.
Let me leave you on a positive note as I close
with the subject of CBM's related to the "Bus Service" between two
sides of divided Kashmir. As I mentioned previously, there are not many divided
families to begin with and most are in the Jammu region where the (Poonch-Rawalkot)
bus service across the LOC has just begun. The true value in the LOC crossing
points, however, is in promoting trade and commerce across the region. So
the "Bus Service" needs to be augmented by the "Truck Service"
before full potential of the cross-border crossings can be realized.
Stability and peace in the Kashmir region
is not only feasible but also possible. It involves cessation of all terrorist
acts, political liberalization (particularly in Pakistan Administered Kashmir),
better governance, and increased trade across the LOC border. There is no
"silver bullet" and it would greatly help if my colleagues would
stop wasting their energy on redrawing borders in Kashmir. Areas that lack
self-governance should get it. Areas that have self-governance should strive
for better governance. Once that happens, trans-nationalism in Kashmir will
take a whole new meaning.
1 "War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48,"
C. Dasgupta, Sage Publications, 2002.
The writer is a Director and Past-President
of Indo-American Kashmir Forum, Maryland, US.
