Author: V.P. Malik
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: March 24, 2007
URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/story/26503.html
Introduction: Deciding such sensitive issue
without professional consultations or by using street pressure is dangerous
The threat of the People's Democratic Party
(PDP) to break up the ruling alliance, if Jammu and Kashmir is not demilitarised
and if the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act is not repealed, has again raised
the ultra-sensitive issue of the politicisation of national security. Having
experienced similar situations in the past (and written about it in my book,
Kargil - From Surprise to Victory), it may be useful to make a few observations
in this regard.
But first, two important points. One, in a
democratic country, all security decisions are finally in the domain of politics.
Two, excessive or protracted utilisation of troops for internal security and
law and order problems is neither good for the nation nor for the security
forces. After a while, it has an adverse impact on the public mind, the professional
psyche of the troops and their operational effectiveness. Frequent operational
review of troop deployment in such situations is, therefore, essential. Thus
there can be no objection to the PDP raising issues of troops' reduction or
repeal of the AFSPA with its ruling partner in the state or even with the
Centre.
My reservations are about this being made
into a threat - and in making political capital out of a sensitive strategic
and security issue. In democratic countries, such decisions are taken by the
political leadership on the basis of professional assessments. That is why
there are institutions like the National Security Council, Cabinet Committee
on Security, and so on. It is also necessary to consult the affected state
governments like J&K.
Deployment of troops on the border/Line of
Control (LoC) and within J&K, which is affected by external dimensions
of terrorism (cross-border infiltration), is a sensitive security issue. It
requires detailed professional inputs and assessments. The strength and deployment
of troops along the border/LoC are decided on the basis of assessed military
and non-military threats (including infiltration) from neighbouring countries
and internal security requirements. The deployment in the hinterland is to
ensure public and property security and to isolate/eliminate terrorists. There
are several tactical and administrative considerations for such deployment.
Deployment, particularly in the hinterland, is seldom permanent. The increase
or decrease of troops and their redeployment is constantly under review. It
depends upon information, local and overall assessments and operational missions.
The dynamic nature of troop deployment does
not mean that it can be a switch-on and switch-off affair. It involves orientation
and familiarisation of the terrain and the situation becoming operationally
effective. A PDP member has belatedly tried to clarify that their demand is
for the return of troops to the cantonment and not for de-militarisation.
Another member has cited the example of Assam Rifles vacating Kangla Fort
in Imphal. But that was done for a new location near by. All this fuels the
suspicion that the PDP demands are more political and less related to the
security situation.
My contention is that deciding such sensitive
issues without professional consultations or by using political and street
pressure to ensure such changes in policy implies sidelining of the professional
advice for political expediency. Making professional institutions and advice
irrelevant or ineffective in order to make political capital would be a retrograde
step.
It may also be noted that we have more than
adequate experience of such troop deployments and redeployments - more than
most countries. I have personally been involved in many such situations, including
in Mizoram, Punjab (1992-94) and J&K. Political leaders in J&K would
recall that after the Parliament and assembly elections in 1996, the army
was withdrawn from Baramula, Sopore, Srinagar, Badgam and Anantnag. Paramilitary
troops were deployed in these towns to assist the civil authorities and civil
police maintain law and order. The militants managed to re-entrench themselves
in Sopore after some time. An army formation had to undertake operations to
eliminate them and ensure public security and civil governance.
A word on the repeal of the AFSPA. The Act
is the legal authority for troops to operate effectively in insurgency- and
terrorism-affected areas, when there is the ever-present danger of an ambush.
The Armed Forces cannot perform counter-insurgency or counter-terrorist operations
without legal authorisation. The requirement of the AFSPA and its authority
are already under review. On this issue, my response and advice would be the
same I gave to a Manipur CM 17 years ago. The best way out is to create conditions
wherein the AFSPA is not necessary. If the state and the Centre do not consider
and declare an area to be a 'disturbed' one, the AFSPA cannot be applied.
Please do not blame the AFSPA for the problems of J&K. The fact is that
we have not been able to create good governance and conditions when this Act
need not be applied.
It needs to re-stated that military pressure
alone does not resolve internal security or law and order problems, unless
there is good governance. Indeed, political leaders must take note of public
grievances and discuss them with the concerned authorities, particularly when
they happen to be part of the ruling coalition. However, if such demands are
likely to compromise national security, they must also correct public impressions
and not exploit them for political reasons.
Public accountability is indeed a pre-requisite
for good governance. But accountability on sensitive issues like national
security needs to be sought within the framework of constitutional establishments
and not through political jingoism.
The writer, a former chief of army staff,
is president, ORF Institute of Security Studies, New Delhi
