Author: Amaresh Misra
Publication: The Indian Express
Dated: August 16, 2007
Introduction: Atlee, when asked why the British
were leaving India, specifically mentioned the Indian army's role
The year 2007 is special in that it marks
both the 150th anniversary of the first war of Indian independence and the
60th anniversary of achieving it. The link between these two events, however,
seems tenuous, since they appear to arise from different historical impulses.
But new research reveals that there was in fact a semblance of continuity
between them. Alex Von Tunzelmann's new book, The Indian Summer, with plenty
of hitherto unpublished material, suggests as much. Two other books by wellknown
British historians Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, entitled Forgotten Armies:
Britain's Asian Empire & the War with Japan, and Forgotten Wars: The end
of Britain's Asian Empire, also emphasise this point.
During the centenary celebrations of 1857,
Nehru in his famous Red Fort speech argued that British colonialism was fundamentally
different from other armed incursions into India: while the Mughals made India
their home and contributed to its prosperity, the British drained India's
wealth, enslaving the country.
There is an interesting episode related by
Forbes Mitchell, who was part of the 93rd Highlander Regiment which fought
in 1857-8 in Kanpur, Lucknow and other theatres. In 1891, Mitchell visited
India and was struck by a story doing the bazaar rounds. It was said that
Suffur Ali, a sepoy who was humiliated and hanged by Brigadier Neill at Kanpur
in July 1857, had issued a revenge call on Neill's descendants in the name
of his infant son, Mazar Ali. In the 1870s Mazar Ali joined a British regiment
and became close to Major A.H.S. Neill, Brigadier Neill's son, without knowing
his antecedents. One night, a fakir visited Mazar Ali and informed him of
Major Neill's background. On March 14, 1887, in Augur, Ali shot Neill's son
in broad daylight.
Bayly and Harper's work showcase the rumblings
in the Indian army that made the British realise the possibility of 'another
1857'. In 1915, Indian army units revolted in Singapore following the Ghadar
party propaganda. Then during the 1930-32 Civil Disobedience movement, the
Garhwal Regiment refused to fire on Indian freedom fighters in Peshawar. Bayly
and Harper also profile how Indian army personnel fighting for the British
in the 1940s were "nationalists" and "made clear to their British
officers early on in the war that the writing was on the wall for Imperial
rule".
During the 1942 Quit India Movement, T.B.
Dadachanji, a Parsi VCO, "disobeyed an order to take a mobile column
into a riotous city on the grounds that he might be forced to shoot his own
people". Yet Dadachanji was not court-martialled. Drawing a parallel
between 1857 and 1942, Bayly and Harper note wryly that "if a new Indian
Mutiny were to break out, would it not be in Lucknow where the Union flag
still waved over the ruins of the old British residency?"
Apparently, the ignominious British defeat
at Japanese hands in 1942 played a major part in denting the myth of imperial
invincibility. Subhas Chandra Bose's INA tapped into the widespread discontent
of Indian army personnel, especially over the way British officers had abandoned
them during the Allied flight from Singapore. That 'INA sympathies' crossed
over to influence Congress leaders, moderates, and those soldiers who remained
'loyal' during the Second World War, was demonstrated in November 1945 during
the Red Fort INA trials. The trial of Shah Nawaz Khan, P.K. Sehgal and G.S.
Dhillon, three INA officers, saw Nehru don the barrister's robe after decades.
Sardar Patel called the INA men "patriots" and observed that a trial
should instead be initiated against Viceroy Linlithgow, the man in charge
during the 1943 Bengal famine. V Savarkar, the author of .D. the first book
on 1857, had sent a telegram to British Prime Minister Attlee demanding general
amnesty for all INA prisoners: "it was signed, not with Savarkar's name,
but with a date, '1857'". In one epochal incident, the Gurkha escort
accompanying Sehgal to the trial premises did not intervene when a scuffle
broke out between Sehgal and some British officers. The British read this
as a danger sign, as Gurkhas were considered the most 'loyal' amongst 'loyalists'.
The British were ultimately unable to prosecute thousands of INA men.
In 1946, an actual army 'mutiny' broke out
at the Jabalpur cantonment. News of it was suppressed, but 'leaks' prompted
other 'mutinies' in Hyderabad, Madras, Pune, Lucknow and Calcutta. The 1946
naval 'mutiny' spread from Bombay to Karachi and Calcutta. Prime Minister
Attlee, when asked why the British were leaving India, specifically mentioned
the army's role. Indian soldiers, he observed, could not be 'trusted' to
hold India. He had good reason to come to that conclusion.
The writer has authored 'War of Civilisations:
India 1857 AD'
