Author: Rajeev Deshpande & Vishwa Mohan
Publication: The Times of India
Date: September 3, 2007
M K Dhar, an IPS officer who served nearly
30 years in the IB, has suggested in a new book that a chief minister had
links with the Pakistani spy agency ISI. He did not identify the chief minister
only for the fear of being hauled up in a court for defamation. Prodded by
TOI, he limited himself to saying, "he was a CM from a north Indian state''.
In political circles, however, it is not difficult
to hazard a guess about the identity of the stalwart. Dhar's colleagues in
the IB, both serving and retired, confirm Dhar was not engaging in a sales
overpitch for his book. "Political interference is rampant and increasing.
What is shocking is the complete lack of sensitisation to the threat,'' a
senior IB official, who insisted on anonymity for obvious reasons, told TOI.
A retired officer, who handled a crucial anti-terror
station in the IB, concurred. "There have been so many cases where our
tip-offs and suggestions for action have generated an 'identity not confirmed'
response-a shorthand for reluctance to proceed.'' An immediate case in point
is, of course, Andhra Pradesh. Despite interrogation reports of captured terrorists
pointing to RDX consignments reaching Hyderabad, the police were not allowed
to pick up suspected sympathisers of terror outfits for questioning. It is
only after the August 25 twin blasts, that brothers of main accused Mohammed
Shahid or Billal were questioned. It took 43 deaths for the police visiting
"politically sensitive'' parts of the Walled City to question establishments
suspected of radicalising youth. The reason: reluctance to annoy a political
party which is supporting regimes in the state and at the Centre.
Significantly, while states have always been
sensitive to charges of negligence, the Andhra government has refrained from
responding to the criticism. It has also not been able to shake off the perception
that two IPS officers were taken off their crucial charge. In Andhra itself,
it is not the only instance where the line between political and security
considerations blurred into indistinction.
The other glaring example is that of the inexplicable,
many would say suspicious, manner in which the present government suddenly
upturned its policy towards Naxalites, from June 2004 to January 2005, proclaiming
its intention to engage with the 'misguided' youth. The Centre put its stamp
of approval when there was nothing to suggest that the Naxals had developed
a faith in peaceful means or democratic way of dispute redressal. The farcical
ceasefire was called off, but only after the Red ultras had used the breather
they had shrewdly gained to regroup, and to beef up their firepower. The continuing
massacres in Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand stand stark testimony to the
folly. Still, we have no answers from either Hyderabad or the home ministry
for the flip-flop.
Informed critics put the inconsistency to
political reasons. Authorities deny this, saying that they just wanted to
give peace a chance. That they were guilty of naivete, is borne out by militarystyle
attacks by Naxals using heavy firepower and army tactics in incidents like
the Jehanabad jail bust in November 2005 and the massacre at Dantewada in
March where 50 personnel were killed. The boldness of Naxal cadres in imposing
their "law'' in tribal areas of five states points to a growing menace.
The lack of accountability is equally conspicuous
in the handling of the secessionist and ISIbacked United Liberation Front
of Assam with the Centre and the Assam government wavering from "teach
them a lesson'' to "doors are always open for negotiations'' rhetoric.
This when the terrorists have stepped up killings, going after Hindi-speaking
migrants as part of what is regarded as a plan to clear the way for more Bangladeshi
illegals. Only this year, Ulfa has murdered 100 migrants after having declared
its plans to do so in its mouthpiece in December last year.
The lives could have been saved if only the
army had been allowed to finish the job it was given to: liquidate ISI's auxillary
in the North- East. Ulfa faced three major military offensives so far. Each
time, the outfit suffered heavy losses and its leaders were on the run. It
would have been decimated has the government gone ahead with the Operation
Rhino II it had planned. But the military, all ready for action, did not get
the green light for some inexplicable reason.
The Centre and now even the state government
have continued with the pretence of holding negotiations with Ulfa even when
the latter's commander-in-chief, Paresh Baruah, contemptuously rejects the
condition to negotiate within the framework of the government of India. Worse,
the Centre's interlocutors, Indira Goswami and others who become active whenever
pressure mounts for military action, don't seem to have even a brief from
Baruah and Co, safely ensconced in shelters arranged in Bangladesh by the
country's Directorate General of Foreign Intelligence and the ISI.
In UP, the state which has suffered some of
the audacious use of terror attacks on Ayodhya and Varanasi's Sankat Mochan
temple-authorities have been seen soft-pedalling on terror for long. The startling
examples include the lethargy in seeking the prosecution of the accused in
the Shramjeevi Express blasts and other terrorists.
The Mulayam Singh Yadav government disappointed
many on this score. It ignored tell-tale evidence of the involvement of outlawed
outfit Student's Islamic Movement of India to certify its innocence. "What
is the signal that the cop on the beat gets from this,'' asked a disgusted
police officer. Yadav, prior to the 2007 UP polls, also made a political issue
of the extension of the ban on SIMI to UP. This is not Mulayam's only brush
with controversy on this score. In 1994, a IB raid with some UP cops on Lucknow's
religious seminary, Nadawat-ul Ulema, was botched up as news of it got leaked
and the team of sleuths ran into resistance at the seminary. Mulayam whose
policemen, sources at the Centre insist, were involved in the action, promptly
denied any knowledge of the raid, and suspects at the seminary were allowed
to get away. Since then, many places and persons have become no-go zones in
the state. Dhar, in his book, disclosed that IB had definite information on
ISI links with politicians in different states. According to him, in West
Bengal, about half a dozen legislators, prominent labour leaders and students'
unions were seen to be influenced by the ISI.
Without mentioning the time period, Dhar revealed
that the ISI had reached over 10 legislators and two ministers at different
points of time in Assam. Besides, at least four legislators and a minister
in Bihar in touch with Kathmandu-based ISI operators who had helped bonding
between certain mafia groups in Nepal, Bihar and UP. The damning assertion
is yet to be challenged.
In any case, few needed his testimony to learn
about the political resistance to seal the border with Bangladesh even in
the face of mounting evidence that it has substituted the LoC in J&K as
the entry point for the ISI to send in jehadi terrorists. The reluctance to
touch the issue of immigration, increasingly mixed up with the the national
security consideration was obvious two years ago when minister of state for
home Sri Prakash Jaiswal disowned the figure that he had himself quoted regarding
the presence of millions of illegals from Bangladesh. He was rescued from
the attack by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who said there was no authentic
estimate of illegal influx.
In J&K, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen's links with
politicians are welldocumented and in one instance, during the chief ministership
of Mufti Mohd Sayeed, could have had a disastrous consequence. But this is
being winked at on the ground of "special conditions'' in the trouble-torn
state.
A senior police official in a state capital
seems resigned to political interference, but makes a strong case for not
extending it to what he calls "sacrosanct areas''. "In any democracy,
political interference cannot be avoided. It is sine qua non of the system
we have. It may even be necessary at times. But we should make it clear to
all concerned that national security is non-negotiable for the same reason-people's
well-being-which is the basis for such interference,'' he said.
In Kerala, Abdul Nasser Madhani, founder of
the radical Peoples' Democratic Party, has been acquitted of the charge of
organising the 1998 Coimbatore blasts which were meant to assassinate BJP
leader L K Advani. The blasts killed 58. But much before he was acquitted,
because of what the IB and the home ministry call weakness of prosecution,
there was a race among Kerala politicians to proclaim his innocence. There
was a unanimous resolution adopted by the Kerala assembly while the DMK government
arranged for ayurvedic massages. "We haven't heard of any move to appeal
the acquittal-not even by those who have said that the evidence was not fully
appreciated by the court. What is the message one can draw from this?'' asked
an officer.
In Maharashtra, the state's anti-terrorism
squad was taken off the probe into the Malegaon blast and the CBI brought
in when they had cracked the case and made the arrest. The switch was made
following a hue and cry by politicians and others. Ironically, the same ATS's
probe was praised as a breakthrough by authorities in the state as well as
the Centre. The cynical use and abuse of the power to intervene has become
so rampant that now it is just a few officers who are willing to stand their
ground. Most feel the battle against political interference is not winnable
and have decided to put career before principles.
(With inputs from Mumbai, Kolkata and Lucknow)
