Author: PTI
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: March 23, 2008
The late President KR Narayanan, who had a
'strained' relationship with the AB Vajpayee Government, has come in for criticism
from BJP veteran LK Advani for procedures adopted by him during Government
formation in 1998 and also during its fall a year later.
Along with that, Congress President Sonia
Gandhi also came in for flak for her "seeds of conspiracy" to destabilise
the Vajpayee Government and later for the "big lie" spoken in the
premises of Rashtrapati Bhavan claiming numbers in her favour to form the
Government.
"The ten-day delay by President Narayanan
in inviting Atalji to form the Government raised many eyebrows. He had set
a new precedent concerning the appointment of Prime Minister -- namely, if
an election to the Lok Sabha produced a hung house with no party or pre-election
coalition having a majority, then only that person would be appointed Prime
Minister who succeeds in convincing the President, through letters of support
from allied parties, of his ability to secure the majority," he writes
in his memoirs.
Writing in his book My Country My Life, Advani
says in doing so Narayanan "diverged" from the actions of his two
illustrious predecessors R Venkataraman and Shankar Dayal Sharma who had invited
the leader of the single largest party or pre-election coalition to form the
Government without ascertaining their ability to secure the confidence of
the House.
Advani cites the famous Bommai judgement of
Supreme Court in 1994 as well as the Sarkaria Commission's report to say that
the Governor is duty bound to invite the leader of the single largest party
or pre-poll alliance to form the Government. Whether or not he enjoys the
confidence of the House should be decided on the floor of the Assembly and
not in Raj Bhawan.
"This being the spirit of the Constitution,
the President of India could not possibly legitimise a different procedure
in appointing a Prime Minister," Advani says.
"Narayanan, who came to be known as an
'activist President,' asked Atalji to furnish letters of support to demonstrate
the NDA's ability to secure a majority. This gave time and opportunity to
the Congress party to indulge, vainly, in some unholy politicking to wean
away some of our potential allies," he says.
No doubt, he adds, it (Congress) failed in
its attempt but the "indirect encouragement" it received from the
President in 1998 whetted its deep-rooted destabilisation instincts in 1999.
Vajpayee was able to meet the President's
demand and was sworn in as Prime Minister in March, 1998 on the condition
that he would prove his majority in the Lok Sabha within ten days.
Before this Government formation, Advani recalls,
Congress was not deterred from trying to stitch together an alternative minus
the BJP. Ultimately, the logic of elementary mathematics prevailed over the
"lust for power," he says.
"'We have no numbers to form a Government,
so we are not staking a claim,' conceded Sonia Gandhi after meeting President
Narayanan. It was clear from her statement that what prevented her from staking
claim was the failure to rustle up the necessary numbers, not the realisation
that Congress had been denied mandate by the people. I am saying this here
because her words hid an intent, indeed the seeds of a conspiracy to destabilise
the Vajpayee Government which would become manifest in a big lie spoken in
the premises of Rashtrapati Bhavan in May, 1999," writes Advani.
Advani then narrates the events during the
days before the fall of the 13-month Government of Vajpayee in early 1999.
Alarmed by the "positive developments"
of "bomb, bus and budget," a reference to Pokhran nuclear tests,
Vajpayee's bus ride to Lahore and the Union budget, the Congress party returned
to its "old game" of destabilising non-Congress Governments.
It raised a demand for dismissal of DMK government
in Tamil Nadu, a demand which the Vajpayee Government could not accede to,
Advani says.
"On April 14, 1999, the AIADMK withdrew
support to the NDA Government. Once again, President Narayanan played a key
role in the heated political developments. He asked Prime Minister Vajpayee
to seek a vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha within three days," he
writes.
Advani says that inspite of the short time
available, the NDA was able to garner the support of several smaller parties
and the Government was wondering whether there was a valid reason for the
country to be pushed to the brink of another mid-term election.
Finally, when the motion was put to vote,
the Government lost by the smallest conceivable margin -- one vote -- 269
to 270.
He describes it as a "morally and politically
fraudulent, albeit technically valid vote".
Advani says the Congress and other Opposition
parties who had "boasted" that they would form the alternative Government
in five minutes could not do so even after five days.
"President Narayanayan started to play
an activist role again" by writing to Sonia Gandhi, inviting her to hold
discussions with him. "After the meeting she made a startling claim that
she had the support of 272 MPs and intended to form a Government," he
says.
Advani writes that while those in the NDA
were taken aback by Gandhi's announcement "many among the non-Congress
parties also wondered how the Congress president could utter such a white
lie in front of Rastrapati Bhavan when the arithmetic on the Opposition completely
refuted her claim."
Advani then narrates a secret meeting he had
with Mulayam Singh Yadav at Jaya Jaitley's residence at the instance of NDA
convenor George Fernandes. During the meeting, Mulayam promised Advani that
his party would not support Congress and it wanted fresh elections.
Subsequently, Gandhi could not muster the
numbers and the President granted her two more days. "As my colleague
Arun Shourie said, 'the President was straining to see one combination out
and a particular one in,'" Advani writes.
Advani quotes a Rastrapati Bhavan statement,
which said that Gandhi conveyed to President that she would continue her discussion
with parties and individuals who voted against the motion of confidence and
"advise the President on her efforts as early as possible."
"For all of us in NDA, it was unbelievable
to read that Sonia Gandhi told the President that she would advise him of
the results of her efforts. Who is advising him?," he writes.
Gandhi met the President again and informed
him of her inability to get the support of any more MPs and that her party
would not support a third front Government.
"What followed thereafter is even more
instructive for those who wish to study sound practices by the incumbents
of Rashtrapati Bhavan," Advani says.
President Narayanan met Prime Minister Vajpayee
and gave him his assessment that the 12th Lok Sabha was not capable of yielding
a Government with a reasonable prospect of stability and in his perception
dissolution had therefore become necessary.
Advani says although NDA was not keen to approach
the President to explore possibility of forming the Government again "we
did find it odd that he should have thought of dissolving the Lok Sabha when
it had barely completed the first year in its five year tenure by precluding
the option of inviting Atalji to form a minority Government."
He then refers to the "sound precedent"
set by Venkataraman who allowed PV Narsimha Rao to form a minority Government
in 1991.
Advani says that the Cabinet meeting held
shortly thereafter put the onus for dissolution of the Lok Sabha on the President.
Advani writes that while the Cabinet recommended
to the President to dissolve the House in deference to his assessment of the
situation, Rashtrapati Bhavan communique later merely said that the Cabinet
recommended dissolution of the House so that a fresh mandate could be obtained.
"This was certainly not true. There was
wide diversion in the President's perception of the situation and that of
Atalji's Government."