Author: Kanwal Sibal
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: March 15, 2008
URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/story/284543.html
Introduction: If China raises territorial
issues to provoke India, it is because it has fewer stakes in improved ties
than we do
For Tibetans, March 10, 1959 is the day of
their national uprising against the Chinese, which culminated in the flight
of the Dalai Lama to India through Tawang. Indian authorities restricted this
year's commemorative demonstrations by Tibetans in Delhi; and their plans
to organise a march on Lhasa, by crossing the border at an undisclosed point
on an undisclosed date, are bound to be foiled by watchful Indian and Chinese
agencies. The aim is to politically embarrass the Chinese, by exposing the
Tibetan skeleton in their cupboard, just when China is engaged in image-building
for the Olympics.
Tibet is at the heart of our border problem
with China. Hu Jintao can well declaim that China's stability is dependent
on Tibet's stability, but how can this be achieved if China refuses to deal
with the Dalai Lama and keeps conflict alive by laying periodic claims to
Arunachal Pradesh? Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's January visit to Arunachal
Pradesh elicited the usual Chinese protest against trespass into their territory.
Although the protest was at a middle diplomatic level, it does reveal the
iron in China's posture and its indifference to Indian public opinion.
Such protests are hardly in tune with the
relationship attained between the two countries. Indian and Chinese leaders
meet regularly. A bilateral strategic dialogue of sorts has begun. They are
working together at the East Asian Summit and ASEAN-linked fora like the ARF.
They cooperate in WTO discussions or in those on climate change. China now
has observer status at SAARC, dissolving our past paranoia about Chinese intrusions
into India's geographical space. Peace on the border is being maintained despite
the periodic testing of our nerves by the Chinese in 'disputed' areas along
the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Bilateral confidence building measures now
include joint military exercises. Trade between the two is increasing faster
than predictions, with the target now raised to $60 billion by 2010.
If China raises territorial issues to provoke
India, it is because it has fewer stakes in improved ties than we do, and
the confidence of a stronger hand. Tibet has been subdued sufficiently with
force and prosperity - the physical infrastructure for controlling and integrating
it has been developed, including a railway line.
Militarily, China has an advantage on the
border because of its easier terrain and better infrastructure. In the western
sector, it holds a line even beyond its own claims. In the eastern sector,
it withdrew voluntarily in 1962 and now claims more territory as part of 'meaningful'
territorial adjustments.
It plays the Tibet card against us without
compunction, undeterred by the fact that its own position on Tibet is contested
by the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people. With India unwilling to politically
capitalise on the enormous goodwill the Tibetans and their spiritual leader
have for it, China can afford to remain on the offensive. Adding to this disequilibrium
is the widening economic gap. With more resources, China is investing heavily
in advanced weapons technologies, which will widen the military gap as well.
Unlike Pakistan's position vis-a-vis India,
we have not made the resolution of the border dispute a pre-condition for
normalising bilateral ties with China. This gives China reduced incentive
to reach a settlement. While we may see our approach as mature, constructive
and contributing to peace, the Chinese could easily view it as yielding and
conciliatory. So, China profits from our diffidence. Its posture on the border
keeps us off-balance politically and militarily, while imposing economic costs
on us.
Periodic reports of China making incursions
into our territory jitter India. India defensively claims that the incidents
are confined to areas where the two sides have differing perceptions about
the LAC. Our chief of army staff has earned criticism by suggesting shared
culpability in transgressions across an undefined LAC. The rational approach
would be to delineate these perceptions on the map, identify the pockets of
overlapping claims and then find a solution. The two countries agreed to do
this exercise sector by sector, but the Chinese reneged on the understanding
in 2002 on specious grounds when the exercise moved from the middle to the
western sector. In June 2003, we proposed a 'political' approach, which meant
a reasonable give-and-take based on agreed political parameters and guiding
principles. While the LAC approach pre-supposed only marginal adjustments
of the border, the political approach has perversely allowed China to claim
territory not under its control, thereby keeping the special representatives
of the two sides from moving forward.
No Indian government can accept the kind of
territorial concessions China wants in Arunachal Pradesh. Forty-five years
after vacating Tawang, to seek to reclaim it indicates that they either doubt
our resilience or don't want a settlement for the moment. No great matter
of principle is involved for them here. They have settled the boundary with
Russia as well as with Central Asian countries with very nominal territorial
adjustments.
During the PM's January visit to China, press
reports indicated that both sides have formulated and tabled their respective
drafts of a possible framework agreement involving territorial concessions,
and that the Indian side has raised 21 issues on the Chinese draft. This seems
to be a confusion caused by officials who elaborate little on the substance
of the talks because of their sensitivity and the tendency of the press to
make news without much material. A working group of mid-level officials will
discuss further the ideas exchanged between the two sides, possibly after
the current deliberations of the National Peoples' Congress are over. On the
issue of settled populations, the Chinese are creating room for themselves
by seeking their classification into small, medium and dense pockets. Our
desire to resolve the long-pending border issue is not only not shared by
the Chinese but they are also exploiting it to impose unacceptable conditions.
We let China patronise us, looking for signs
of goodwill, be it about a permanent Security Council membership or international
civilian nuclear cooperation. On the other hand, such is the complexity of
our attitude towards China that we openly speak of developing missiles and
submarine capabilities able to reach China's heartland. There is much virtue
in becoming strong, but none in boasting muscles we don't yet have. The vocal
chords of our democracy are often unnecessarily loud.
- The writer is a former foreign secretary
sibalkanwal@gmail.com
