Author: V. P. Malik
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: October 7 2008
URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/defensible-not-defiance/370083/0
There is little wisdom in writing for a newspaper
on an issue on which the editorial and the editor in chief have already given
a verdict ('Chain of command, demand'). But I am motivated by two factors:
"national interest" and the words of The Indian Express founder,
"Be forthright, be frank, be fearless, whatever the odds. Never hesitate
to take a stand if you believe in it. Never hesitate to speak out boldly against
the wrongs."
The issues being debated are: (a) should the
services chiefs have represented to the defence minister on the cabinet decision
(before implementation) relating to 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC), and
(b) the manner in which they informed their command about efforts to get the
anomalies resolved and advised them to be patient on the enhanced pay package.
Does that construe "a dangerous precedent" and crossing the Laxman
Rekha? It is unfortunate that no one has investigated why the chiefs were
driven to take this step and who gave the spin of "defiance" to
their actions.
Besides the blatant discrimination and injustice
done in the constitution of the 6th CPC and in processing its report, despite
pleas and caution conveyed by servicemen from inside and ex-servicemen from
outside, there is no doubt that pent-up frustration from past experiences
would have made the chiefs explain and write to the defence minister.
Many older ex-servicemen have written about
the frustrations of the 3rd and the 4th CPC. Let me narrate my experience
as vice chief and later as chief of army staff in the processing of the 5th
CPC. On receipt of this report, the Government appointed a group of ministers
to resolve the anomalies. Despite many unresolved anomalies, including one
that had upset parity between the armed forces and police personnel below
officer ranks (PBOR), the defence secretary had signed the financial order.
I rang up the defence minister, who was in Calcutta that day, and said that
these instructions, if released, would cause serious dissatisfaction amongst
the rank and file. The minister stopped release of the financial order, discussed
the issues with the chiefs next day, and then wrote a letter to the prime
minister strongly recommending the desired changes. The new pay scales were
held back for some months till major issues concerning PBOR were resolved.
In November '97, I wrote to the minister again
pointing out the remaining unresolved anomalies, including relativity and
functional problems due to upgradation of pay scales at additional DGP and
DGP level. The government appointed a high-level committee under the defence
secretary to resolve all remaining issues of the 5th CPC, which submitted
its report in April 1998. This report was processed by yet another committee
under the cabinet secretary for the next 18 months but did not resolve (or
did not wish to resolve) all issues. Despite several reminders to the defence
minister, many anomalies remain unresolved. Many retired officers took recourse
to the courts and won their cases.
Three points are to be noted. One, the pay
revision of all armed forces personnel was delayed till the defence minister
got major issues resolved, quite similar to what is happening in the present
case. Two, no one told us that we had set a bad precedent or crossed a Laxman
Rekha. Three, the chiefs would certainly be aware of the frustration and demoralisation
caused in the processing of the 5th CPC.
The pressure from the ex-servicemen lobby
cannot be denied. Besides the institutional camaraderie, izzat and pensions
are closely related to the final 6th CPC award. Ex-servicemen look up to their
chiefs for amelioration of all their problems. Another factor is non-implementation
of one rank, one pension, a demand that has been publicly accepted by political
leaders in the past and present governments.
In processing the present report, I have yet
to see any statement by the defence minister or the chiefs that would suggest
"defiance", or words remotely close to it. All three chiefs have
repudiated any such suggestion. The letter written by the naval chief merely
explains the anomalies issue and advises the rank and file to remain patient
because its resolve may take time. My guess is that the "defiance"
and "pull up" stories are being deliberately aired by babus responsible
for distribution of "information" to journalists. Compared to these
babus, the chiefs can offer very little newsy information.
It is surprising that my friend Shekhar Gupta,
who not long ago said, "In no other major democracy are the armed forces
given so insignificant a role in policy making as in India. In no other country
do they accept it with the docility they do in India", has opined that
this show of "defiance" is bound to result in a civilian riposte
to take away some autonomy of the future chiefs. That cannot be ruled out.
But does it mean that the chiefs should never raise or question issues that
are so obviously wrong, unjust and bound to have serious impact on the morale
of their services? If that be the desirable trait amongst senior officers
then I will go one step further and state that such armed forces will never
be able to win wars.
Sometime ago, former Defence Minister Jaswant
Singh wrote in his book Defending India, "A combative mentality has grown
between the service headquarters and the ministry. Such an attitude has its
own damaging consequences; the defence ministry, in effect, becomes the principal
destroyer of the cutting edge of the military's morale; ironic considering
that the very reverse of it is their responsibility. The sword arm of the
state gets blunted by the state itself. So marked is resistance to change
here, and so deep the mutual suspicions, inertia and antipathy, that all efforts
at reforming the system have always floundered against a rock of ossified
thought."
The problem is that on the pretext of establishing
civilian political supremacy over the military, we have developed a system
of bureaucratic control, the like of which does not exist in any other country.
If the military loses confidence in such a system, or gets isolated from the
policy planning and decision-making process, it would affect its psyche, ethos
and capability to advise and perform.
Given today's rapidly changing geo-strategic
environment, it is imperative that we change our mindsets and attitudes, and
look beyond narrow boundaries defined by turf and parochialism. A face-to-face
dialogue and military advice are critical for the success of policies concerning
military personnel and their missions.
The writer was chief of army staff
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