Author: C. I. Issac
Publication: Vijayvaani.com
Date: September 5, 2009
URL: http://www.vijayvaani.com/FrmPublicDisplayArticle.aspx?id=794
The recent biography of Jinnah by Jaswant Singh has ignited a heated controversy.
In the light of the new exposition, the names of Jinnah and Nehru are being
debated widely in Indian elite circles. These were very scarcely debated in
the days of our freedom and ensuing years. The main reason for this was the
carnage following the vivisection of 'Mother India.' Then India had no time
to think about or to make a pros and cons analysis of the situation.
Within a short time, Jinnah dream was reduced
to that of the proverbial milkmaid. Four wars between India and Pakistan and
the subsequent development of cross-border terrorism, rise of American interest
in the sub-continent, growing arms-race, etc., all changed the course of the
history of this archipelago. Sri Aurobindo's prophecy that the division would
'not last long' was not discussed properly. In the deluge of time, the space
for intellectual debate was shrunk due to non-availability of documents. Many
documents were either ignored or destroyed deliberately to keep the vested
interests of the Nehruvian dynasty; the missing documents are numerous.
These include documents pertaining to the
dual relations of leaders like Motilal Nehru with the Empire; the exit of
Nariman from politics; the British assessment of Nehru, etc. The caucus around
the 'Nehru dynasty' concentrated only on getting their space in the corridors
of power. Those who enjoyed immense political influence and its bits and pieces
through the Interim Government were not much bothered about the need for an
un-divided India. Hence, in the days subsequent to the dawn of freedom there
was no time to debate the role of Jinnah and Nehru.
The history of the Partition of India is essentially
the story of two power-mongers - Jinnah and Nehru. Who will be seated at the
apex of sovereign India, whether divided or undivided, was the question to
be sorted out between them.
Motilal Nehru, through his access to Gandhi
and the Congress, aimed to 'make the way straight' for his son, Jawaharlal,
to the prime minister-ship of future India. He was one of the wealthy leaders
of then Indian National Congress (INC). Since 1909, he was at the zenith of
his legal profession by gaining approval to appear in the Privy Council of
Great Britain. Therefore he had good relations with British officialdom in
his capacity as a prominent lawyer of the Allahabad High Court, and opposition
leader of the Central Assembly as well as leadership of the Indian National
Congress leadership.
Michael Breecher remarks, "he was a complete
man with many-sided interests" (Nehru: A Political Biography, p 39).
The entry of Motilal's glamorous and foreign-educated son, Jawaharlal, into
politics in 1916 was the beginning of the most powerful Indian political dynasty.
When Motilal Nehru handed over the Congress president-ship to his son in 1929,
it was with the blessing and the backing of Gandhiji. It greatly pleased Motilal
and Nehru family and admirers to see the son takeover from his father. No
leader of India was gifted such a walkover in the history of our nation in
modern times.
The elevation of Jawaharlal to the president-ship
of the INC with the blessings of Gandhi provoked Jinnah, who was then very
close to him.
Motilal imparted the basic lessons of 'white-collar'
national movement to his son and did not appreciate the son's obsessive nationalism.
Anyone who looks at Jawaharlal's criticism of Motilal's 1928 report, the Nehru
Report, can see a game of hide and seek therein. All these aimed to make a
marking position for his son in the future India. A similar game was later
played by father and daughter to ensure the persistence of the Nehru dynasty
at Indraprastha. Anyhow, the Nehru family became the weakness of Gandhi, who
noted the death of Motilal as "should be the envy of every patriot."
No doubt Gandhi was a nishkama karmi (man
of disinterested action) of high order; a religious Hindu who stood for a
secular state. Correspondingly, he was a firm believer in the Gita. He strictly
pursued the message of Chapter II Verse 47, "let not the fruit of action
be thy motive". Krishna prohibits Arjuna from desiring the spontaneous/innate
fruits of his actions.
But Gandhi moved further and sacrificed the
intrinsic fruits of his action, that is, the political leadership of India.
His stance on the leadership of free India was contrary to the universal practice
of 'leader of the revolution to be the leader of the new order.' Instead of
assuming the political leadership of free India, he gave it to Nehru, the
'noblest blunder' in Indian history. This may be one of the prime reasons
for the inevitable vivisection of 'Mother India.'
Jinnah was the only staunch Congressman with
spine, who opposed the move to share the Khilafat platform. For many years
he was an antagonist of the Muslim League. In the 1910 Allahabad session of
the Congress, he moved a resolution condemning the system of communal representation
offered through the Govt. of India Act 1909. A few months before the death
of Sir Mohammad Iqbal, he commented to Nehru that 'Jinnah is politician' (Discovery
of India, p 355).
Jinnah left the Congress not because of the
Hindu-Muslim question. Nehru certifies that it was because his idea of politics
was of a superior variety (Ibid p 365). While Jinnah was giving evidence before
the Joint Select Committee appointed by Parliament to examine the Govt. of
India Reform Bills 1919, he unequivocally stated that 'the Hindu-Muslim riots
are instigated by the police.' To substantiate his contention, he cited the
examples of the riot-free princely states of India.
The 1920 Nagpur Congress finally voted for
Khilafat-Non Cooperation wedlock. It was during this session that Jinnah left
the INC. He retired from Indian politics and from India, and settled down
in England. After the long stay there (1920-28), he returned to India and
migrated to the new political space, the Muslim League.
This change of political complexion was gradual
and he took more than a decade to identify himself with the Muslim League.
Subsequently, he put forward his historic 'fourteen points' through which
he registered the demand for a federal system of government, contrary to the
Nehruvian dream, and simultaneously found space in the document to extend
solidarity with Muslim politics. Gandhi was not against his federal concept.
As an opportunist, Jinnah was able to strengthen his domain in the new haven
through the novel gimmick of 'fourteen points.'
The absence of Jinnah geared up Nehru as undisputed
leader of the INC. All other leaders of the then contemporary politics found
solace in Nehru and played second fiddle. Said Nehru, "Mr. M.A. Jinnah
himself was more advanced than most of his colleagues of the Moslem League.
Indeed he stood head and shoulders above them and had therefore become the
indispensable leader" (Ibid p 394). But Jinnah dreamed of the efflorescence
of democracy and federalism in Pakistan.
Keith Callard observes, "The background
of the men who organized the campaign - for Pakistan - was not theology and
Islamic law but politics and common law, not Deoband but Cambridge and the
Inns of Court. Mr. Jinnah and his lieutenants such as Liaquat Ali won Pakistan
largely in spite of the men of religion. They led a secular campaign to create
a state based on a religion" (Pakistan, A Political Study, London, 1954,
p 200).
The leaders of Muslim politics of the day
were well aware of the designs of Jinnah. But their main concern was the end,
not the means. His second wife was a Parsee; for most of his life he seldom
kept a fast during the month of Ramzan; openly drank liquor and ate pork that
is forbidden by Islam; etc; all highlights his communal credentials may be
fake or ironic.
"…in course of time Hindus would
cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious
sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political
sense as citizens of the State" (Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, (ed.), Speeches
and Writings of Jinnah, Vol. II. Lahore, 1964)
This historic address in the Constituent Assembly
of Pakistan on 11 August 1947 is sufficient testimony to the dubious proposition
of his two-nation theory. His dreamland was not to survive because of the
wrong option of Islam as a means to cherish him in the annals of history as
'father of a nation'. Even though Jinnah was not a committed Muslim, he was
sometimes well aware of the indigestibility of democracy to Islam. Hence between
the devil and the deep sea, his option of devil may be the result of the psychosis
he suffered. One cannot blame him for this choice, because he was a power-monger.
In the absence of Jinnah, opportunism gained
momentum in the Congress. In the 1935 Provincial Assembly elections, the INC
under the leadership of Nariman got a thumbing majority in the Bombay Presidency.
Nariman's candidature as CM was genuine. Sardar Patel and his equals could
not stomach a Parsee as CM of Bombay. Patel and his colleagues "could
not reconcile themselves to such a position and felt that it would be unfair
to the Hindu supporters of the Congress to deprive them of this honour"
(Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, p 16).
Thus B.G. Kher was made CM. Nariman was heart-broken
and his public life came to an end. Nehru was then the president of INC. But
to Nehru, for the realization of his goal, Patel's friendship was essential.
A like situation developed in Bihar also.
Here Dr. Rajendra Prasad played the game. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad evaluates
that, "the Congress did not live up to its professed ideals" (ibid
p18). No doubt, inside the Congress certain venomous developments evolved.
The first victim may have been Jinnah; others were subsequent additions. But
behind the charisma of Gandhi, all these stains were not noticed by the rest
of the world. One cannot acquit the conclave evolved under Nehru behind the
magnetism of Gandhian era. Really the rudiments of communalism were inherent
in the propositions of the INC.
Much water has flown under the bridge after
the stepping-down of Jinnah from the INC. The elevation of Nehru as undisputed
steward of the INC in the absence of competent personalities made a U-turn
in our history. Gandhi stood for an un-divided India, an end for which he
was ready to go to any extent. Patel's craze for power was an important reason
for the failure of the interim government. "Patel who was in his anxiety
to retain the Home portfolio offered Finance to Muslim League - Liaquat Ali
(ibid p 197). This was a foolish action and as a result the hands of Congress
Ministers were tied.
"Lord Mountbatten took full advantage
of the situation" (ibid). The British were waiting to punish the INC
for its anti-War stand. Sri Aurobindo and other visionaries and creative thinkers
of the day disapproved the anti-War stand of the INC and termed the decision
unripe and shallow. They were well aware of the future consequences of this
unripe decision. Thus an opportunity fell in British hands and they successfully
utilized it.
Consequently Patel became instrumental in
deciding the destiny of India. He was the first man to fall into Mountbatten's
trap. Before the arrival of Mountbatten, Patel was mentally prepared to accept
vivisection as a fact. "Sardar Patel was fifty percent in favour of partition
even before Lord Mountbatten appeared on the scene" (ibid). Thus he became
the first prey to Mountbatten.
Another villain of vivisection was Krishna
Menon, the weakness of Nehru (ibid p 198-9). Menon, Patel, and other power-crazy
elements in the INC, along with Mountbatten and family, transformed Nehru
from acquiescence to the idea of partition to a supporter.
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad said, "Now a
situation had arisen where we were becoming greater supporters of partition
than Jinnah. I warned Jawaharlal that history would never forgive us if we
agreed to partition. The verdict would be that India was divided not by the
Muslim League but by Congress" (ibid p 202).
Let us examine the situation in the light
of Maulana Azad's confession. Gandhi strove to avoid a disaster - the vivisection.
He suggested 'let Jinnah to form government with ministers of his choice'.
Gandhi was well aware of his health; he was confident that the office of prime
minister will become vacant in a couple of years. But this was vehemently
opposed by Nehru and Patel. "In fact they forced Gandhiji to withdraw
the suggestion" (ibid pp 203, 204).
Patel became dear to Indians through his bold
diplomatic exercise of integration of princely states in the Indian union.
His craze for power was not a secret since the days of the interim government.
His only priority in this critical hour was the earliest transfer of power.
That is why he insisted with others for this 'hedonism'. One cannot refute
the responsibility of Patel in the security lapse and subsequent assassination
of Gandhi. In this milieu, who can prosecute Jinnah alone for the sin of vivisection
of 'Mother India'?
In the light of the above, who can blame Jinnah,
who can praise Patel and Nehru? In order to save the face of some, several
documents were suppressed or destroyed. The records relating to the disappearance
of Subhash Chandra Bose are still shrouded in mystery. Who is still frightened
of the soul of Subhash? Who made Kashmir an ulcer of India? What was the intention
behind giving special constitutional status to Kashmir? Why does the Congress
party remain constantly under the wings of the Nehru dynasty?
These are questions Time must answer. The
contributory responsibility of three opportunists-cum-democrats is very clear.
The present debate, even though it is late, does not end with these few questions.
- The author is a retired Professor of History,
and lives in Trivandrum
