Author: Kanchan Gupta
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: January 31, 2010
URL: http://www.dailypioneer.com/232672/US-legitimising-the-Taliban.html
It matters little to the 70 countries whose
representatives met in London last Thursday to discuss the modalities of striking
a deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan what Afghans think of the cowardly
decision. "The London conference was not about Afghanistan, but about
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown's re-election campaign," Mr Aziz
Hakimi, who heads an NGO in Kabul, has been quoted as bitterly commenting
after the adoption of a $ 500 million 'Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund'.
Those who take a less than charitable view of US President Barack Hussein
Obama's much-hyped but utterly hollow AfPak policy and America's trans-Atlantic
ally's sudden urge to end the Afghan war have promptly dubbed the 'Peace and
Reintegration Trust Fund' as the 'Taliban Trust Fund'.
The outrage is understandable. The absurd
theory of there being a 'good' Taliban with whom the world can co-exist in
peace and a 'bad' Taliban who should be shunned has finally been put to practice.
Worse, the London conference has succeeded in erasing the mythical line separating
the 'good' Taliban from the 'bad' Taliban. Never mind the display of faux
displeasure and bogus dismay by the Americans in London; we can be sure that
the decision to bribe the Taliban, 'good' and 'bad', with "jobs and homes"
- euphemism for sacks of greenbacks - so that they give up their murderous
ways, had the Obama Administration's prior approval. In fact, the proposal,
for all we know, may have emanated from Washington, DC. It was unveiled in
London.
Mr Mark Sedwill, Nato's newly-appointed civilian
chief in Afghanistan, has been candid enough to admit that the proposed deal
will involve reaching out to "some pretty unsavoury characters".
In effect, this means seeking peace with those who have sheltered Al Qaeda's
top leaders, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. They will be
asked to "cut ties with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and pursue
their political goals peacefully" for a certain price to be settled in
cash. The US, at least officially, was opposed to a blanket offer, insisting
that it should be limited to Taliban 'fighters'. But it does not appear to
have pushed this point too far, which only suggests that the 'Peace and Reintegration
Trust Fund' is the outcome of a pre-rehearsed, carefully scripted, exercise.
Ironically, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which
worked in tandem with the US in the early-1990s to facilitate the birth and
rise to power of Mullah Omar and his evil gang that the world came to know
as the Taliban, will now "play a key role in the reintegration process".
Pakistan, cock-a-hoop over the outcome of the London conference, has offered
its services to train the Afghan police and security forces. We could soon
see the ISI expanding its reach into, and control over, Afghanistan. In a
sense, the US has conceded Pakistan's claim over Afghanistan; Islamabad can
now look forward to regaining its 'strategic depth' through a puppet regime
in Kabul.
Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai is welcome
to believe that he has secured his job, but so did Mohammad Najibullah suffer
from delusions of invincibility till he was strung up from a lamp-post with
his family jewels stuffed into his mouth. Yet, there's little that Mr Karzai
can do, apart from hope that the American and Nato troops won't just up and
leave but hang around "for at least a decade". The contours of the
'reintegration process' will emerge at a peace jirga which Mr Karzai says
he will convene in the coming weeks. But it's unlikely that he is in command
of the unfolding situation: It's more than likely that Pakistan, backed by
the US, will now call the shots, to begin with covertly and increasingly overtly
as it gets into the act of reclaiming what it had lost in the aftermath of
9/11. Unless, of course, things go horribly wrong and the 'Taliban Trust Fund'
turns out to be a non-starter.
For the moment, there is no reason to believe
that the proposed deal with the Taliban will unravel, or be an exclusive affair
restricted to the 'good' and not the 'bad' among the wretched lot. It now
transpires that regional commanders of the Taliban's infamous Quetta Shura
held secret talks with the UN's special envoy to Afghanistan, Mr Kai Eide,
in Dubai on January 8. The Guardian, which broke the story, quoted officials
as saying, "They (the Taliban) requested the meeting to explore avenues
for talks. They want protection to come out in public." A UN official,
confirming the Dubai talks, said, "The Taliban made overtures to the
Special Representative to talk about peace talks… That information was
shared with the Afghan Government and the UN hopes that the Afghan Government
will capitalise on this opportunity." Capitulate, and not capitalise,
would be a more appropriate word.
Having decided to sup with the devil, it makes
little or no sense to set a standard for those invited to the supper. Ms Hillary
Clinton, rather than take recourse to subterfuge, was being honest when, commenting
on the London deal, she said, "The starting premise is you don't make
peace with your friends." Having accepted this fact, the Obama Administration
should stop pretending that it is opposed to the idea of a "future Afghan
Government that includes allies of Mullah Omar". Nor should US Special
Representative Richard Holbrooke make a show of insisting that the "peace
plan should focus on low-ranking Taliban fighters motivated by money, not
ideology". Mr Holbrooke is welcome to insist "That is not on the
agenda here. There is nothing happening on it involving the United States"
and that "the Taliban's renunciation of Al Qaeda is a red line"
for the US. Such assertions on drawing a 'red line' amount to what is referred
to as a 'red herring'. If Pakistan and the Taliban suffer from serious trust
deficit, so does the US.
India should be worried - very, very worried
- about the US-sponsored attempt to legitimise the Taliban and thereby instal
Pakistan's proxy regime in Kabul. But with a limp-wristed Government taking
instructions from the US, there is little that we can do other than fret and
fume. There is something extremely sinister about the orchestrated clamour
in the New Delhi Establishment, of which certain sections of the media are
an integral part, for the resumption of India-Pakistan talks. That the dubious
initiative to revive the stalled bilateral dialogue should coincide with the
London conference and the appointment of Mr Shiv Shankar Menon as National
Security Adviser is not entirely surprising. India's humiliation at Sharm
el-Sheikh will now be taken to its logical conclusion by Mr Manmohan Singh,
ably assisted by Mr Menon. If you have any doubts, look at the craven alacrity
with which Minister for External Affairs SM Krishna has signalled that the
UPA Government is willing to "do business" with a Taliban legitimised
by the US.
