Author: D S Tewatia
Publication: Vijayvaani.com
Date: March 3, 2011
URL: http://www.vijayvaani.com/FrmPublicDisplayArticle.aspx?id=1654
Godhra Incident- Analysed- Facts and Inferences
There has been so much said, written and broadcast
about the Godhra incident that it is difficult to distinguish between facts,
half-truths, innocent imagination and motivated lies. Media and interested
parties have selected, distorted and added fiction to the story to prove their
respective points of view.
Unfortunately, professionalism took a back
seat as media persons, fact-finding commissions and administrators by and
large failed to maintain the fairness, neutrality and objectivity expected
from them. To engage in a dispassionate analysis the Study Team has divided
all the facts relating to this incident into four categories:
1. Indisputable facts.
2. Facts that appear to be true but need verification.
3. Information that appears to be untrue.
4. Mysteries.
Indisputable Facts
1. On 27.02.02 Sabarmati Express from Faizabad
reached Godhra more than four hours late.
2. There were more than 2000 Hindu pilgrims
on this train.
3. No serious dispute took place at the platform
at Godhra between the passengers and the vendors.
4. The entire train was stoned right after
it left the platform at Godhra and it continued even after it was stopped
at Signal Faliya.
5. Firebombs, acid bulbs and highly inflammable
liquid(s) were used to set the coaches on fire that must have been stored
already for the purpose.
6. Miscreants succeeded in torching only one
coach.
7. The conspirators did not allow the fire
fighting staff to reach the burning train expeditiously.
8. The iron grills of the windows of S-6 were
broken and bent from outside.
9. Fifty-eight passengers of coach S-6 were
burnt to death by a Muslim mob and that one of the conspirators was a Congress
Councillor, Haji Balal.
10. The train was stopped by pulling the chain
and the vacuum pipe was cut.
11. Someone used the public address system
exhorting the mob to kill kafirs and enemies of Bin Laden.
12. Assembly of a mob of about 2000 Muslims
in three minutes could not have been spontaneous.
13. The attack on Sabarmati Express on 27.02.02
was pre-planned and pre-meditated. It was the result of a criminal conspiracy
hatched by a hostile foreign power with the help of local jehadis.
Facts That Need Verification
1. There was a conspiracy to reduce the effectiveness
of the fire fighting system of Godhra municipal committee.
2. The mob that burnt the coach had Muslims
from outside the town as well.
3. Firearms were used by the mob.
4. Police could have caught or killed some
of the miscreants at the spot.
5. Local politicians and elected representatives
took active part in instigating the mob.
6. Railway Police at Dahod sent a message
to Godhra Railway police that some Muslim youths on board Sabarmati Express
were likely to create mischief at Godhra.
7. Head of a passenger of S-6 coach was cut
when he tried to get out of the window. The head was later thrown back into
the coach to burn.
Police investigations have opened the lead
to an autorikshaw used for purchasing the petrol from a local petrol-pump
and carrying the same in jerry cans to the Signal Falia area and still continuing.
Information That Appears To Be Untrue
1. Some women passengers are missing.
2. Some women passengers were raped or molested.
3. Passengers had pulled the beard of a vendor
at Godhra Railway Station.
4. Passengers carried weapons with them.
5. Railway staff connived with the miscreants.
6. The pilgrims had taunted certain Muslims
of Godhra while returning from Ayodhya.
7. Police firing while they were burning the
coach killed two Muslims.
Some Mysteries
1. Assistant Collector, Godhra (a young Muslim
from eastern UP) goes on leave two days before the incident and does not return
till the middle of the March while the district of his posting was aflame
with communal riots.
2. The unusual growth rate of Muslim population
in Godhra.
3. Absence of information with the District
officials about the number of arms licenses issued.
4. Abnormally large number of passports issued
to the residents of Godhra.
5. Presence of a very large number of persons
without ration cards in Signal Faliya and Polan Bazar areas of Godhra.
6. A large number of unemployed Muslims in
Godhra have mobile phones.
7. Very high traffic of telephone calls from
Godhra to Pakistan (mainly Karachi) before 27.02. 02.
8. Holding of istema - religious gatherings
- at Godhra that were attended by foreigners in large numbers.
Communal Riots in Gujarat after 27.02.02 both
Spontaneous and Planned but a Trap of International Terrorism
The news of the events of 27. 02.02 at Godhra
at about 0800 hrs spread like wild fire all over the country by the afternoon.
The television media, which has the advantage of instantaneous reporting,
played its role in disseminating the information about this carnage. Nothing
happened for almost twenty-four hours, though the situation was said to be
very tense. Vishwa Hindu Parishad gave a call for state-wide bandh to protest
against the Godhra carnage. Communal violence erupted almost simultaneously
on 28.02.02 in many parts of the state when the charred bodies, the injured
and the passengers travelling in the ill-fated train reached their homes.
It became more intense during next twenty-four hours and started subsiding
after that. After 01.03.02 there were only stray incidents of communal violence
in certain parts of the state.
On 15.03.02, after shila daan ceremony at
Ayodhya by Ramchandra Paramhans, processions of Ram dhun were taken out all
over Gujarat. The participation on these occasions was very large in Gujarat,
presumably as a reaction of what had happened in Godhra. The Ram dhun processions
at many places including Ahmedabad and Vadodra became the points of communal
tensions once again and the communal tension that was subsiding again flared
up.
Although the Muslim elders had assured the
police at Vadodra that peace would be maintained at all costs, the processions
were stoned from a mosque. The intensity of the attack proves that these were
pre- meditated. The attack was so massive that the police had a tough time
handling it.
The state once again came under the grip of
communal riots. The rioting was very intense for about three days. Sectarian
violence, however, continued in several parts of the state even three days
after the attack on Hindu procession at Vadodra.
Incidents of violence on a large scale were
initially reported from Ahmedabad and Vadodra towns and the districts of Panchmahals,
Sabarkantha and Mehsana. Later it spread to other areas also. However the
communal violence was mainly confined to Central and North Gujarat. Saurashtra
and South Gujarat remained relatively peaceful. There was no communal violence
in almost one half of Gujarat.
The team was told that when the charred bodies
of the dead reached their families or the news of their killings reached the
relatives, friends and neighbours attacked the nearby Muslim establishments.
Similar incidents took place when chautha and kriya ceremonies of the dead
were solemnised.
Gujarat has a long history of communal riots.
The first such riot has been reported in 1714. After independence major riots
broke out on several occasions since 1969. Jagmohan Reddy Commission of Inquiry
of 1969 and Dave Commission of Inquiry of 1985 analysed the causes and consequences
of communal tensions in great details. Serious rioting occurred in 1970 and
also in 1992-93. According to official data, Gujarat witnessed 443 major communal
incidents between 1970 and 2002.
Another characteristic of the communal frenzy
in Gujarat is that it has always taken a long time to return to normalcy.
For instance in Godhra itself in 1985 curfew remained imposed for about a
year. Communal disturbance in 1985 continued for more than five months from
February to July 1985. … …
Administrative Response
Based on the information collected from official
and non-official sources at Godhra, Ahmedabad and Vadodra the Study Team is
of the considered opinion that:
1. The local administration did not respond
with speed to the Godhra carnage. The police remained a passive spectator
and hesitated to use force against the miscreants. It made no attempt to apprehend
the leaders of the mob that indulged in burning alive innocent pilgrims returning
from Ayodhya. However, the administration took preventive measures after the
VHP gave a call for Gujarat bandh in protest against the attack on the train.
2. In Godhra, Vadodra and Ahmedabad the police
tried to control the rioting mobs but, more often than not, failed, as the
police were outnumbered - the mobs were unexpectedly large and the police
were inadequately armed. In certain cases, the mob carried more lethal weapons
that the police had.
3. The administration was not prepared to
handle massive migration of riot affected people of both the communities and
did not have any idea of the quantum of the relief and rehabilitation work
required.
4. Co-ordination between the administration
and the NGOs was inadequate.
5. Training and drills for managing communal
tensions was conspicuous by its absence in a state that periodically witnesses
communal frenzy.
6. Socio-psychological understanding of the
communal divide is lacking amongst the officials.
7. The adverse comments on the transfers of
officials in the media and not so much the actual transfers demotivated the
official machinery.
8. At many places policemen did commendable
work of protecting life and property.
9. Policemen, by and large, responded to the
situation without communal bias.
Deployment of Army
There has been lot of comments on the timing
of the deployment of army in various urban and rural areas in Gujarat after
the outbreak of violence. Although the team did not have enough time to go
into the question in depth, the information made available to it shows that
there was no delay on the part of the Gujarat Government in summoning and
deployment of troops. A comparison with the past is presented for a proper
perspective.
1. By the afternoon of 28.02.02 it was clear
that the communal violence has spread widely and the situation had become
so alarming that it was unlikely to be controlled by the police and paramilitary
forces.
2. On 28.02.02 at 4.30 p.m. the Chief Minister
announced at a press conference that the State Government has decided to call
army to assist the civil administration.
3. By evening the Union Government had given
instructions for the deployment of two brigades in Gujarat.
4. Defence Minister air dashed to Ahmedabad
at midnight and had a meeting with the Chief Minister to discuss deployment
of the army.
5. The army had to be withdrawn from the country's
border with Pakistan despite the fact that the troops are deployed in full
strength in eye-ball-to-eye-ball situation on Indo-Pak borders.
6. Withdrawal of army from the border may
have weakened the country's defensive and offensive strategies.
7. Within less than 24 hours at least one
brigade of Indian Army had air landed at Ahmedabad. In a meeting at 0800hrs
in which Chief Minister, Defence Minister, army generals and civil officers
participated, the formal plan for the deployment of the army was approved.
Magistrates who must accompany the army were appointed and by 11 a.m. on 01.03.02
the actual deployment of army at sensitive points had begun.
8. The second brigade was deputed to Rajkot
and Vadodra on 01.03.02 by that night.
9. Columns allotted to Godhra reached there
in the morning of 02.03.02.
10. Army went back to barracks on 10.03.02.
….
Involvement of Tribals
Earlier in Gujarat, tribals never got involved
in the Hindu-Muslim riots. However, their involvement in post Godhra riots
added a new dimension to the communal violence. In rural areas the vanvasis
attacked the Muslim moneylenders, shopkeepers and the forest contractors.
They used their traditional bow and arrows as also their implements used to
cut the trees and grass while attacking Muslims. They moved in groups and
used coded signals for communication.
Two factors seem to have contributed to this
disturbing phenomenon:
1. A delegation of tribals told the Study
team that the Muslim moneylenders, shopkeepers and forest contractors have
been exploiting the tribals for decades. They charged exorbitant rate of interest
to money loaned to tribals. In certain cases the rate of interest is as high
as 50 per cent per year.
Having got into this never-ending vicious
circle of loans, the tribals have been reduced to the status of bonded labour.
Tribals working as servants are ill-treated by these money lenders who happen
to be Muslims.
The accumulated anger of years of exploitation
became explosive when moneylenders sexually exploited their womenfolk. The
tribals are no longer allowed to use forest produce that has been their sustenance
for centuries. This too fuelled the feelings of anger, hatred and revenge
among them.
2. Tribals have, of late, become conscious
of their Hindu identity because of the awareness campaign launched by VHP
and other Hindu outfits. Burning alive of Hindu pilgrims by a Muslim mob at
Godhra provided the spark for the fire of revenge and hatred.
It may be mentioned that these are only exploratory
postulations, scientific anthropological, economic and sociological analysis
is required to understand the changed behaviour of tribals.
Role of Media
The Study Team received a large number of
complaints against biased reporting', non-objective attitude and anti Gujarat
conspiracy of Delhi Media. The team felt it necessary to objectively observe
and analyse the role of Media both regional and English language newspapers
published from metropolitan cities. It also solicited comments about the role
of media from about 500 persons with whom the members of the team interacted.
The team's observations are:
1. Local and regional papers at times seemed
to be emotionally surcharged and lost sight of objectivity. However, Gujarati
newspapers, by and large, were factual in day to day reporting.
2. The editorial pages of local and regional
newspapers maintained a balance in projecting all viewpoints.
3. Newspapers published in English from Delhi
invariably editorialized the news. Direct and indirect comments in the news
writing were so telling that the personal likes and dislikes of the news reporters
were too obvious to be missed.
4. English language newspapers published from
Delhi appeared to have assumed the role of crusaders against the State Government
from day one. It coloured the entire operation of news gathering, feature
writing and editorials.
5. The edit pages of English language press
carried comments that clearly indicated biases:
- against the State Government of Gujarat,
- in favour of Congress, leftist parties and
the secularist intellectuals,
- indifferent to the carnage at Godhra,
- against the Hindu organizations, and
- against the NDA government at the Centre.
6. Most of the national newspapers and news
channels played down the intensity of Godhra carnage and projected it as a
result of provocation by pilgrims. Not many reporters were deputed to dig
out facts or to do follow-up stories. This resulted in large number of editorials
and articles that projected Godhra as a reaction to provocation by karsevaks'
and riots in rest of the state as "state sponsored terrorism".
7. A distorted image of sectarian violence
in the state was projected by the electronic and print media based in Delhi.
8. Repeated telecasts of arson and violence
contributed in spreading the tension to unaffected areas. TV channels ignored
warning from officials and kept telecasting communal riots like infotainment.
9. Coverage of Machhipiti in Vadodra is an
example. One national news channel went overboard to telecast police firing
at Machhipiti as if it had taken place in Ahmedabad.
10. On 27.02.02 the Government of Gujarat
announced a compensation of Rs. 2 lakh for the next of kin of victims of Godhra
carnage. There were protests about discrimination between Hindu and Muslim
victims and the Government announced on March 9 that all victims would get
Rs one lakh.
Yet, as late as the first week of April a
Congressperson in USA cited a report in an Indian newspaper to accuse the
Government of discriminating against minorities in the grant of compensation.
The newspaper concerned did not care to inform its readers of the correct
situation.
11. The code of ethics prescribed by the Press
Council of India was violated by the media with impunity. It so enraged the
citizens that several concerned citizens in the disturbed areas suggested
that peace could return to the state only if some of the TV channels were
closed for some weeks.
12. Media did not help to cool down the tempers.
It failed to act as a platform for a dialogue between the Hindus and Muslims
on the one hand and between the people and the establishment on the other.
The Study Team is of the considered opinion
that the media in general failed to perform as conscious and socially responsible
gatekeepers of information.
It followed in the footsteps of an American
journalist who said, "My job is to report the facts. I give a damn to
the consequences".
Telecasting images that spread hatred and instigated violence is unhealthy,
but their repeated telecast is lethal. The media acted as an interested party
in the confrontation, not a neutral reporter of facts.
The team was alarmed at the intensity of hostile
attitude among the people of the state for Delhi press and television news
channels. This attitude was especially articulated by delegations of intellectuals
like lawyers, doctors, and businessmen. Even the tribals complained that the
media had no time to hear their tale of their agony and was spreading canards
against the Hindus.
Conclusions
Terrorism nurtured by communal disharmony:
The Godhra carnage and related incidents make
a typical case study of international designs and conspiracies to weaken India
as an emerging world power. Analysts and professional strategists of all ideological
inclinations converge on one forecast that India is going to be a major player
on the international scene sooner rather than later.
The global community also realizes the inevitability
of India becoming an important economic and military power. In such a situation
it is but natural that nations hostile to India or its adversaries make all
out efforts to create impediments in this process.
Their strategy is to keep India engaged in
communal and caste strife so that the nation's focus on development is defused
and its endeavour to emerge as a super- power is thwarted. It would surprise
no one if Pakistan with the tacit support of not-so-friendly neighbours and
world powers hatches conspiracies to destablise and weaken the Indian State.
A careful and in-depth analysis, if carried
out with an open mind, would throw open an action plan where terrorist activities
appear to be merging with the already existing strong antagonism between Muslims
and Hindus. Our hostile neighbour, sometimes in the guise of a friend, keeps
on creating wounds on the body polity of our nation.
Creation and perpetuation of Kashmir problem
is one such example. The support to the authoritarian regimes in Pakistan
by USA and European countries speaks volumes about the super power's commitment,
or lack of it, to democratic values. Godhra and the wide spread communal violence
in Gujarat in recent weeks is a part of this nefarious design.
The Study Team concludes
1. Burning of 58 Hindu pilgrims at Godhra
on 27.02.02 was an act of international terrorism carried out with the evil
objective of pushing the country into a communal cauldron.
2. The plan was to burn the entire train with
more than two thousand passengers in the wee hours of February 27, 2002. It
was a terrorist action plan that partly failed. The perpetrators of the terrorist
acts received support from jehadi elements operating from Godhra. These included
some Congress members of the Nagarpalika. … ….
- [For more details, please contact the Council
For International Affairs And Human Rights, A-208, Surajmal Vihar, Delhi 110
092 (Phone 2374816, fax 2377653, Email http://lw11fd.law11.hotmail.msn.com]
