Author: Ajai Sahni
Publication: The Times of India
Date: May 4, 2011
URL: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-04/edit-page/29499374_1_operation-terrorist-leader-long-road
In the wake of the dramatic US operation at
Abbottabad, which ended in Osama bin Laden's death, some fantasists here have
begun to wonder whether India has the 'capabilities' to carry out such strikes.
The question can and should be quickly answered.
Given the experience of 26/11 in Mumbai and
the quality of responses witnessed there, as well as in a host of earlier
operations, and knowledge of 'capacity building' thereafter, it should be
abundantly clear that India does not have the necessary capabilities to carry
out such operations even on its own soil, leave alone deep inside hostile
territory.
This unfortunate circumstance is the cumulative
result of a systematic neglect and weakening of India's security apparatus,
and the dismantling of covert capabilities by successive administrations over
decades. This does not, of course, mean that such capabilities cannot be restored.
Such an outcome would, however, require a measure of strategic acuity, resilience
and determination on the part of our political leaders, which they give no
evidence of possessing.
It is, indeed, difficult to imagine any of
India's present crop of leaders - from the Left, the Centre or the Right of
the political spectrum - doing what President Barack Obama did on April 29,
2011: sitting with national security advisers to evaluate intelligence and
then signing, on record, an executive order authorising an operation to execute
a terrorist leader on foreign soil.
The Abbottabad operation, and the very long
road that led to it, should demonstrate, even to India's blind leadership,
the necessity of creating capacities for covert operations and surgical -
including deniable - strikes in hostile territory, within the context of the
long war that the country is currently engaged in with terrorists and their
state sponsors. What is little noticed in the frenzied commentary on the bin
Laden killing is the fact that it is the culmination of sustained efforts
of three successive presidencies, and two presidents at ideological poles,
one from the other; and further, that it arises out of the imperatives of
a clearly stated counterterrorism policy which declares unambiguously:
"When terrorists wanted for violation
of US law are at large overseas, their return for prosecution shall be a matter
of the highest priority and shall be a continuing central issue in bilateral
relations with any state that harbours or assists them...If we do not receive
adequate cooperation from a state that harbours a terrorist whose extradition
we are seeking, we shall take appropriate measures to induce cooperation.
Return of suspects by force may be effected without the cooperation of the
host government..."
Billions of dollars, tremendous diplomatic
arm-twisting, and a relentless commitment to their policy goals have enabled
the Americans to secure this limited victory, even as Obama concedes, "His
death does not mark the end of our effort."
India's policy flip flops in the wake of repeated
Pakistan-backed terrorist outrages; the constant swing of the pendulum between
the fruitless alternatives of 'talks' and 'no talks' with Pakistan; New Delhi's
importunate appeals to the Pakistani leadership to abandon its visible support
to terrorism and to other countries to do what we are unwilling or unable
to do ourselves, contrast embarrassingly with American resolution in this
case. Of course, US policy has its own contradictions and vulnerabilities
in other areas, particularly on the broader AfPak front. It is important to
note, however, that the US continues to engage with regimes in Pakistan, in
full awareness of their role in supporting anti-US terrorism, particularly
in the AfPak region, without altogether abandoning its own core interests
or limiting its strategic and tactical options.
Bin Laden's death will have little impact
on the organisational and operational capabilities of al-Qaida and its affiliates,
including groups operating in India, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammed
and Harkatul Mujahiddeen, among others.
Nevertheless, a complex dynamic has been unleashed
by this event, and the circumstances of its occurrence. It is inevitable,
given bin Laden's safe house in the heart of a garrison town and in close
proximity to major military establishments, that Pakistan's role in supporting
and sponsoring terrorism will come under microscopic scrutiny from this point
on, and this may impose even greater constraints on that country's adventurism
than currently exist. The killing, moreover, will have an inevitably dampening
effect on Islamist extremist terrorism worldwide, in the medium term. This
is particularly the case since it occurs against a backdrop of a rising wave
of rebellions - including peaceful uprisings - at once, against authoritarian
rule and theocratic oppression, across wide areas of the 'Muslim world'.
There is, however, a residual and great danger.
Orchestrating a major or catastrophic terrorist strike has now become a survival
imperative for al-Qaida and its many affiliates. Only such an attack, or a
series of such attacks, can help restore the 'global jihad', win back weakening
support, and stem the progressive fragmentation of these groups under the
onslaught of repeated reverses (crucially, bin Laden was only the most prominent
and most recent of a string of al-Qaida-affiliated leaders who have been neutralised
- arrested or killed - over the past decade). This creates an imminent threat
worldwide, and certainly in India as well. Tremendous vigilance will be needed
from overstretched intelligence and security forces in the coming weeks and
months to ensure that such risks are not realised.
More significantly, however, it is a long-term
imperative for democracies to develop systems and capacities to protect themselves
against ruthless enemies who recognise no limits to their violence, and to
contest the ideologies of hate that are, today, vigorously propagated even
within liberal cultures.
- The writer is executive director, Institute
for Conflict Management and South Asia Terrorism Portal.
