Author: Ajit Doval
Publication: The Times of India
Date: September 11, 2011
URL: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-11/special-report/30141672_1_instrument-of-state-policy-policy-framework-terror
The US hasn't suffered another terror attack
on its soil since 9/11. India has been hit repeatedly. What have they done
right, and where have we gone wrong?
The US has some advantages that India does
not. Unlike India, the US does not share a border of over 3,000km with a terror-sponsoring
state. It does not have to live with a hostile Pakistan using terrorism as
an instrument of state policy. Nor does it have internal political sensitivities
compounded by votebank politics.
Also, India does not have the reach to leverage
and influence multilateral forums like the UN and the requisite technology
back-up and resources to invest in the war against terror.
The domestic settings of the two countries
are vastly different - leaders with political maturity and an understanding
of problems; a responsible, informed media as against an episode-centric alarmist
media; a criminal administrative system based on trust of law-enforcing agencies
as against a legal system totally distrustful of the police are a few differentiating
factors. India, however, has its own unique strengths on which it can build
its counter-terrorist policies, not by emulating the US but by drawing the
right lessons from it.
An approach that has paid rich dividends
for the US is building its strategy around a well-deliberated and comprehensive
counter-terrorist policy. Right from the early 1960s when terrorists started
hijacking planes, the US declared a counter-terrorist policy. It has been
regularly updating and modifying it factoring in new realities, to provide
a definite framework of action to different organs of the government.
They internalised this approach to security
following the Pearl Harbour attack in December 1941 - when the US felt the
need to minimize if not eliminate unaffordable surprises. They made conscious
efforts to work under a well-defined policy framework - articulated with tangible
specifics. To a considerable extent it synergized the security apparatus and
enhanced its capacity to perform, laying considerable stress on system improvement.
Unfortunately, rather than systemic improvement
we have got attuned to episodic response. Individually our security professionals
are as good as the best in the world in terms of knowledge, skills and motivation,
but their productivity is low owing to a confused and non-coordinated effort.
Another contrast in approach is our failure
to analyse each terrorist-related incident, prepare case studies, draw the
right lessons and integrate them in our future operations and training. The
US has made intensive research, both within the government and outside, an
integral part of their security management process. We do not encourage this
kind of research by co-opting scholars and experts in policy-making. Doing
the same thing over and over again and expecting different results next time
is how Einstein defined insanity. Terrorists surprise us because we are unable
to surprise them - and to surprise them you need knowledge domination.
Our actions and responses are predictable
and terrorists know exactly how to defeat our preventive systems, evade detection
and use misinformation to mislead the agencies. The cumulative effect of a
lack of strategy and stereotyping of tactics has made us inconsistent in our
strategic moves and predictable in tactics. Both work to our disadvantage.
The western approach of a pre-defined strategy and surprise in tactics has
helped them considerably in preventing terrorist acts at home.
After the Delhi High Court blast, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh rightly observed that "there are weaknesses in our system,
we must work hard to plug the weaknesses". There are no two opinions
that he cannot shift the blame for this on any one but his own government
that has been in power for over seven years. However, fixing responsibility
does not solve the problem. Three factors can be attributed to this failure.
The first is that national security comes
low in the pecking order of government priority. This was evident from the
UPA's Common Minimum Programme announced in May 2004. The fight against terrorism
hardly figured in the agenda of governance. Despite a series of security setbacks,
no one has cared to revise this document and give national security its due.
Admission of failure and willingness to change
is another pre-requisite for better delivery. The government's attempts to
play down failures, blaming the media for over-reaction, accusing the opposition
of politicizing the issue and citing previous attacks prevent meaningful change.
Lack of political will has seen many useful
suggestions being brushed aside. Some excellent ones by the Second Administrative
Reforms Commission chaired by then law minister Veerappa Moily in June 2008
have not seen the light of day. The recommendations of the Pradhan Committee,
appointed after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, were not even read properly till
the July 2011 attacks happened. Re-enactment of the Police Act that the Supreme
Court has been insisting on following its historic judgment in the Prakash
Singh case remains unimplemented.
All these failures have eroded government
credibility, making both its intentions and capabilities suspect. This is
the worst thing that can happen to a nation. Success in the war against terror
requires the support of civil society, the political class, media, thinkers
and opinion-makers. In the West, governments have been able to conduct themselves
better on security issues, reaching out to even political opponents, experts
and thinkers who do not concur with them.
